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The Economic Impact of Rent Seeking and 
Military Expenditures: 
A Comparison of Third World Military and Civilian Regimes 
By ROBERT E. LOONEY* 
ABSTRACT. The general stereotype of modern Third World military regimes is 
that of ultra-conservativism combined with military force to dismantle orga-
nizations of popular expression. These organizations through their rent-seeking 
activities are assumed to have reduced overall rates of economic growth. Em· 
pirically, the paper does find some support for this line of argument. However, 
It is apparent that the traditional stereotypes are inappropriate. The two regime 
types differ largely in terms of contrasting styles of economic management. 
Military regimes create an environment where military expenditures tend to 
have a positive overall impact on economic growth. Civilian regimes having 
less control over rent seeking groups do not appear to be able to combine rent 
seeking activities and military expenditures in a manner conducive to overall 
economic growth. 
Introduction 
A RELATIVELY NEW THEME being incorporated in the economic development lit· 
erature is the notion that the more permissive a society is in tolerating rent 
seeking, the slower its overall economic growth. Rent seeking arises in the 
context of artificial interferences with markets and refers to the resource-wasting 
activities of individuals and groups who seek transfers of wealth through the 
aegis of the State. In short, the process of rent seeking involves the creation of 
societal institutions designed to establish and preserve market power.1 
Rent-seeking societies are characterized by a distortion of incentives. Weede 
notes that in these societies: "Many types of productive work are insufficiently 
rewarded, whereas successful engagement in distributional and political strug-
gles commands great gains, even If they can be obtained only by generating a 
social loss, In other words, price distortions, allocative inefficiency and less 
growth. Such a linkage between the socioeconomic order and economic growth 
should sound plausible or at least familiar to many economists."2 In this vein 
Jadgish Bhagwati notes that: 
• [Robert E. Looney, Ph.D., ls professor of national security affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 
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No policy of economic development can be carried out unless the government has the capacity 
to adhere to it ... Quite often, however, democratic governments lose equanimity and 
determination in the face of opposition. . . . This is the dilemma of most democratic gov· 
ernments. It is here that socialist countries. . . have an immense advantage: their totalitarian 
structure shields the government from the rigorous and reactionary judgements of the elec· 
torate .... Another advantage of the socialist countries is their passionate conviction and 
dedication to the objective of economic growth, which contrasts visibly with the halting and 
hesitant beliefs and actions of most democracies. The firm ... sense of direction . . . is in 
pointed contrast to extensive revisions and changes in policies and methods which are 
prompted by minor setbacks in most democratic governments and which produce a sense 
of drift and helplessness. The political economy of development poses, in this respect, a 
cruel choice between rapid (self sustained) expansion and democratic processes. 3 
Along these lines, the economic policies of many Third World authoritarian 
regimes are said to include the following distinctive components4 : 
1. greatly reduced control of prices, lower protection, reorientation of the 
practices of public firms toward accumulation of a surplus for investment and 
attempts to keep interest rates positive in real terms; 
2. serious efforts to limit budget deficits and the growth of the money supply, 
more effective taxation, and changes in patterns of public expenditures toward 
more support for the military and for investors at the cost of reduced social 
programs; 
3. wage controls and strict limits on independent action by unions; 
4. highly favorable conditions for foreign investors and reassurance to property 
owners against political action adverse to them. 
Most developing countries are so badly a.IHicted with distortions of allocative 
criteria and incentives and governed so ineptly in terms of economic policies, 
the conscientious economists concerned with solving specific problems some-
times find a great appeal in the idea of "strong governments." Strong governments 
which do heed efficiency criteria can get impressive results in terms of economic 
growth. They may in some cases be able to generate sufficient growth of em-
ployment to create labor shortages and rising real wages for a widening majority 
of the population. Where this has worked, chiefly in Southeast Asia, it is possible 
to conclude that to get prices "right" can be consistent with both increased 
equality and low degrees of repression.5 
In general, however, the expansion of defense expenditures often said to be 
associated with military regimes may erode away any economic gains derived 
from authoritarian economic progress. In fact, a much longer standing theme 
in the literature ls the view that economic development and military development 
are competing claimants on scarce, tangible resources. The more guns produced 
or procured, the less butter available (or for that matter, the less machinery, the 
fewer textile plants) and so on. Military development, in other words, is likely 
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to divert resources that otherwise would be available for development or for 
personal consumption.6 
This view of the competitive relationship between defense and development 
is common to neoclassical micro-economics and to Keynesian macro-economics. 
It is the predominant relationship that exists between economic and military 
development in static allocative terms, and under conditions that are more or 
less in equilibrium (i.e., resources are more or less fully employed, political 
externalities and expectations are assumed to be constant and so on).7 
As Sheahan has noted,8 the problems with respect to emphasis on efficiency 
criteria are double-edged. On the one hand, societies which rely primarily on 
market systems, and which are not highly repressive in the first place, must 
achieve coherent relationships among prices and wages if the economy is to 
respond to obstacles well enough to grow, to alleviate poverty and to maintain 
political acceptance. According to Sheahan, those regimes which neglect effi-
ciency considerations are not likely to make much economic progress and are, 
therefore, likely to have fewer defenders when political strains become intense. 
"On the other hand, measures to increase efficiency may run so profoundly 
counter to the preferences of the majority of politically conscious people that 
their implementation may require systematic repression. Personal freedom may 
be taken away to make free markets possible."9 
Combining the above themes, one might conclude that while strong military 
regimes in developing countries may have the potential to generate higher 
growth rates through reducing rent-seeking behavior, offsets tend to negate 
these benefits; i.e., these regimes have a propensity to allocate a relatively large 
volume of funds to defense related activities. It is possible that these offsetting 
factors have to some extent been responsible for the fact that researchers10 have 
had little success in discerning significant differences in the overall economic 
performances of Third World military and civilian regimes. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed more light on the debate over the relative 
merits of military or civilian models of economic management in the Third 
World. The hypothesis tested is that while there are few differences in overall 
economic performance between civilian and military regimes, there are fun-
damental differences in the way in which each deals with rent seeking, and the 
manner in which their respective military expenditures impact on the economy. 
II 
Methodological Problems 
THE DEGREE to which a society suffers from distributional struggles, rent seeking, 
and contrived transfers is not easily measured. The only systematic attempt to 
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do so was undertaken by the World Bank for 31 developing countries In the 
1970s.11 Fifteen were military regimes, 16 civilian regimes. Because rent seeking 
aims at price distortions favorable to certain influential groups, the World Bank 
price distortion index Is assumed here to serve as an over-all proxy for rent 
seeking. 
If price distortions result from rent seeking and result in less growth, one 
might deduce that the relationship between price distortion and lower rates of 
,,,,~,!~J~.: .. ~·H.:.::·-< 4rdqf~~> 
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Source: eased on data contained 1n Ruth Leger Sivard, World 
Military and Social Expenditures, 1983 (Washington, D.C-:-lrorld 
Prforftfes, 1983) . 
. ~1) da~a are fo~ 1980. 
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growth should be stronger than that between rent seeking and less growth-
that the former relationship must produce a biased estimate of the latter. This 
is not necessarily so, however, because of the offsetting effect of rent seeking. 
Rent seeking not only results in price distortions, but perhaps more Importantly, 
simultaneously diverts effort and resources from productive purposes Into dis-
tributional struggles and political conflict. This latter effort should retard growth 
even when rent seeking does not succeed In distorting prlces. 12 
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The World Bank price distortion index'3 for the 1970s concentrates on dis-
tortions in the prices of foreign exchange, capital, labor, and infrastructural 
services (particularly power). For example, If a country's trade-weighted ex-
change rate does not depreciate during periods of higher inflation at home than 
abroad (and competitiveness thereby eroded), prlma facte evidence exists as 
to the presence of a major price distortion. In this situation, the overvalued 
domestic currency creates an urban bias, 14 and discriminates against the rural 
population. 
Similarly, a distortion of capital prices is assumed to exist wherever real interest 
rates are negative; when if combined with overvalued exchange rates and low 
tariffs on imported capital goods, low interest rates provide incentives for capital 
intensive rather than labor intensive industrialization. This may occur despite 
the fact that most developing countries suffer from a lack of capital and an 
abundance of unskilled or even semi-skilled labor. Minimum wage laws, high 
social securiry taxes, and cheaper provision of infrastructural services by State 
agencies are clues to further price distortions. As with distortions in capital and 
exchange markets, these distortions reduce both allocative efficiency and 
growth. 15 
Another methodological problem concerns the classification of countries as 
military or civilian. Various attempts have been taken to identify the military 
component in politics. Here, a logical approach is to classify countries on the 
basis of subjective estimates of the degree of military influence in the day-to-
day decision making of the government. 16 A government directly controlled by 
the armed forces is an extreme example of militarization of the political process. 
But even long-established democracies where civilian control of the military is 
a firm tradition are not Immune from military influence. 17 The basis of this in-
fluence Is not hard to find: within the central government structure, the military 
bureaucracy has the largest personnel component and administers the largest 
share of the public budget-factors which clearly affect the military's political 
influence. 
For purposes of this study, countries are considered under military control'8 
if they meet one or more of the following criteria: key political leadership by 
military officers; existence of a state of martial law; extrajudicial authoriry ex-
ercised by security forces; lack of central political control over large sections 
of the country where official or unofficial security forces rule; or control by 
foreign military organizations.19 
The countries that fall Into this group in the early 1980s share some common 
features. Most have long records of military rule: the average in 1982 was 16 
years out of the prior 23.20 Interestingly enough, relative to their populations, 
·::-:,, TABLE 2 ~ ~~ i: ~~:·,f~·· IMPACT Of MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND PRICE DISTORTIONS ON PRIVATE s. s' ,!~'.·~~· ~ ·~ CONSUMPTION: MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REGIMES ·:_. 
:,:: 
(Standardized Est1111tes) 
rnile~nilent Variibles- ---------statfstfcs 
Equation JI'.!> Riii! ~r rx Rr ~ Ill . r2 F' 
Mtlffa!l'. R~t11es 
-· ~ (1) PRB • -0.47 -0:28 o.62 ~HH~ (-2.85) (-1. 74). (4.26) ,:4 s-.~ o.773 12.50 ff' ~ (2) -o.53 -o.49 o.53 (-2.36) (-2.36) (2.52) 0.624 6.08 .. (3) -0.50 -0.39 o.47 
(-2.18) (-1.84) (2.30) o.595 5.39 
(4) -0.42 -0.08 o.54 ( 1.97) (-o.32) (2.40) 0.606 5.64 
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" 
-:: . . -
(7) -0.71 -o.36 o.34 
, :., ·~,.: :· ~ (-5.05) (-2.78) (2 .47) '·. o.776 13.85 
NOTE: See text for definition of sYllbols; ( ) • t statistic 
· F-2 • correlation coefficient 
F • statistic 
OF • degrees of freedan 
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military regimes had less men under arms than other Third World countries. 
They also tended to spend less on defense and related activities (see Table 1). 
To test whether price distortions tend to be implemented in fundamentally 
different fashions by civilian and military regimes, a number of regressions were 
undertaken, utilizing various macroeconomic indices as dependent variables. 
Military expenditures were also included in the regression equations to test 
whether or not they impacted differently on the economy, depending on whether 
they were undertaken by a military or civilian regime. 
In a previous study,21 Weede utilized military participation ratios to determine 
the impact defense efforts had on growth. 
Weede's main proposition was that increased defense burdens have tended 
to increase the overall rate of growth in developing countries. According to 
Weede, if a country faces a serious security dilemma, ruling elites perceive the 
need for a strong economy capable of supporting a strong army.22 As Weede 
noted23 for ruling elites, nothing less than their privileged position is at stake 
in serious international rivalries. Lost wars and foreign disasters tend to lead to 
elite displacement. International rivalry creates incentives for efficiency and 
cohesion within ruling classes, because the cost of failure goes up. 
Decision-makers routinely respond to perceived foreign threats by increasing 
their armed forces, often by also introducing conscription. 
Under these circumstances, large parts of the population are affected as young 
men from all social classes are drafted. They are taught military skills, discipline 
or readiness to obey orders, and patriotism. The more serious the threat to 
national security is, the more young men are likely to be affected and the more 
seriously the armed forces take their training tasks. Foreign military threats are 
likely to increase patriotism and national cohesion throughout the populace. 
Presumably, given their pressing need for men for conventional combat, ruling 
elites care more for the "common man" than those regimes which do not face 
a clear and present danger. 
According to Weede, it follows that a series of threats to national security and 
the resulting high military participation ratios produce positive economic effects. 
It does not follow, however, that developing countries grow faster if they spend 
excessive amounts on expensive and imported military equipment, particularly 
in the absence of serious external military threats (or for that matter if they are 
ruled by a military dictatorship).24 
The lower the level of external threats the lower the military participation ratios, the more 
the military may Indulge in bodyguarding dictators, torturing dissenters, or becoming corrupt 
under the pretext of fighting corruption and the less the military is able to contribute positively 
to human capital formation. 
Weede tests and provides empirical sppport for four propositions25 : 
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1. rent seeking and price distortions depress the economic growth rates of 
less developed nations; 
2. rent seeking and price distortions do not equalize the distribution of income 
in developing countries; 
3. high military participation ratios improve the income share of the less 
privileged groups and decrease the income share of the privileged groups in 
developing countries. 
All of these propositions were strongly supported by his data and analysis. 
As noted above, it is important to distinguish between expenditures on ar-
maments and total allocations to the defense sector. Here, the largest proportion26 
of defense expenditure is not spent on armaments, but rather on personnel, 
with a substantial additional proportion allocated to operations and maintenance. 
While it may be true that external factors influence the amount of actual weaponry 
purchased, their effect is less obvious in the case of personnel. Of course, large 
powers might encourage small countries to expand their military capability in 
order to act as a proxy for the presence of the large power in the region. However, 
it seems too superficial to generalize that external factors are responsible for 
the acceleration of defense expenditures as opposed to armaments in developing 
countries.27 
A related factor is that expenditure on recurrent items, especially wages, is 
much less prone to change than "development" expenditure.28 A perceived 
threat is met not principally by expanding the size of the military forces, but by 
purchasing more sophisticated equipment, building bases, etc. This often occurs 
after a period when development expenditures have been fairly steady. Whereas 
defense manpower is a domestic expense, the purchase of new equipment usu-
ally has a high import component. Not only is defense in competition with other 
uses as regards government expenditures, but also with respect to foreign ex-
change.29 
The concern in developing countries as to the extent to which defense ex-
penditure is used as a counter cyclical measure is of much less interest in de-
veloping countries where growth is of greater importance than macroeconomic 
stability.30 Given the operational problems in measuring an external threat and 
the conceptual difficulties of utilizing military participation ratios, and in light 
of recent research tending to indicate that certain groups in developing countries 
may experience positive economic benefits from military expenditures,31 we 
have used various measures of military expenditures in our regression equations. 
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III 
Empirical Results 
THE FIRST MACROECONOMIC AREA In which either rent seeking and/or military 
expenditure might be likely to produce a significant impact is the share of private 
consumption in Gross Domestic Product. Based on the usual stereotypes de-
veloped in the literature, we might expect increased defense expenditures in 
military regimes to come from increasing the tax burden,32 thus reducing the 
disposable income and hence the resources available for consumption for large 
segments of the population. While the same might be the case for civilian re-
gimes, we might expect them to be more inclined to compensate their con-
stituencies through rent facilitating price distortions. 
The share33 of private consumption in GDP, (PRB) was regressed on military 
expenditures per capita, (MEP), the resource balance as a share of GDP, (RBB), 
and a series of price distortions.34 
The results (Table 2) indicate that military expenditures in both civilian and 
military regimes tend to reduce private consumption. In some cases these re-
ductions were offset to a certain extent by capital inflows (RBB); however, this 
variable was not statistically significant for several of the regressions for the 
military regimes. 
Price distortions, on the other hand, played a significant role in influencing 
the share of public consumption in military regimes. The overall price distortion 
index (DI) was highly significant in the regression equations, while distortions 
in the exchange rate (EX), interest rate (RI), wage rate (RW), and overall price 
distortions (IN) individually shifted income to various groups, enabling them 
to increase their overall levels of consumption. Interestingly enough, the size 
of the standardized coefficients for the price distortion measure was nearly the 
same magnitude (but opposite sign) as that on military expenditure, indicating 
that the two combined had a neutral impact on private consumption. Only the 
exchange rate was statistically significant in contributing to the share of con-
sumption in civilian regimes. 
Significant differences were also found between civilian and military regimes 
with regard to both the impact of price distortions and military expenditures 
on the productivity of investment. Here, the productivity of investment (ICOR) 
is defined as the growth in real investment over the 1970-81 period divided by 
the growth in real GDP over the same time period. The average share of gov-
ernment consumption in GDP, (PCB) over the 1970-81 period was included 
as a control variable to account for any impact on production associated with 
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For military regimes: 
ICOR = 0.25 SPCY - 0.88 PCB - 0.77 GDPGB - 0.49 RW 
(1.18) (-3.72) (-3.91) (-2.40) 
r2 = 0.722; DF = 15 [1] 
For civilian regimes: 
ICOR = 0.42 SPCY - 0.14 PCB - 0.67 GDPGB + 0.60 RW 
(2.64) (-0.61) (-2.75) (2.59) 
r2 = 0.576; OF= 13 (2] 
where SPCY = the average share of military expenditures in GDP, 1970-81; 
GDPGB = average annual growth In real GDP, 1970-81, PCB = the average 
share of government consumption in GDP, 1970-81, and RW =the distortion 
in wages. 
The major difference between military and civilian regimes with regard to 
the productivity of investment appears to lie In: (a) the ability of military regimes 
to maintain productivity levels in the face of rising military expenditures, and 
(b) the use of wage distortions by military regimes to increase the productivity 
of investment. In contrast, civilian regimes experience declines in productivity 
associated with increased defense expenditures, while Increased wage distortions 
also tend to reduce productivity. 
Inflation is another performance area where we might expect differences be-
tween military and civilian regimes. Here, inflation refers to the overall increase 
in prices, occurring either as a result of pressures on the government to Increase 
Its deficits, or as the result of various private sector monopolies utilizing their 
market power to Increase prices over the level generated in a competitive market. 
In general, military regimes might be expected to impose higher price controls 
and be more concerned with reducing the rate of inflation than their civilian 
counterparts. Inflation (INFB) over the 1970-81 period was assumed to be af-
fected by: the share of "nonessential" government expenditures (PCB), here 
defined as the average share of public consumption In GDP, 1970-81; the military 
burden (SPES), here defined as the average level of military expenditures per 
soldier, 1970-81; and the overall index of price distortions (DI). 
The results for military regimes were: 
INFB = 0.21 SPES - 0.27 PCB - 0.31 DI 
(-0.76) (-1.00) (1.11) 
r2 = 0.233; OF= 15 [3] 
TABLE 6 
IMPACT OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES ANO PRICE DISTORTIONS ON 
ECON041C GRCMTH: MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REGIMES N 
,f>.. 
( Standa rfzed Estf11ates) 
Inde~ndent Varla61es ~ Statfstks Eguatfon 6Dil;i PCB IE I EX RI IN RW PT F bF 
Mi 1 i ta!l'. R~inies 
(1) GOPQ! " 10.35 -0.31 0.32 -0.50 
:i... (2.34) (-2.84) (2.75) (-3.64) 0.912 23.36 13 ::'! 
lb (2) 0.56 -0.13 0.28 -0.39 :t (4.48) (-1.13) (2.27) (-3.30) 0.902 20.61 13 ~ ti 
::s 
(3) 0.58 -0.28 -0.36 'O' (4.53) (-2.39) (-3.12) 0.895 19.26 13 ;: ~ (4). 0.47 -0.34 0.47 -0.35 ~ (2.69) (-2.41) (2.86) (-2.27) 0.862 14.02 13 <Q.. 
(5) 0.71 -0.24 0.26 ~ 
(7.84) (-2.68) (2.85) 0.743 30.77 35 0 ::s 
0 
Cfvfl fan Re9f11es ::'! ~ (6) GOPQ! = 0.77 -0.11 -0.48 ti (5.13) (-0.86) (-3.21) 0.503 9.77 32 ::s ti. 
(7) 0.74 0.08 -0.10 -0.38 Vi 0 (4.53) (0.48) (-0.67) (-2. 55) 0.794 9.64 14 ~ 0 
(8) 0.88 0.11 -0.19 -0.41 ~ (5.78) (0.69) (-1.36) (-2.92) 0.817 11.14 14 
~ :'."' 
~···· (9), 1.08 0.34 -0.02 -0.56 (7.83) (2.31) (-0.16) (-4.17) 0.876 17 .62 14 
.. _ .., ,"' 
., . 
.. , 
NOTE: See text for deffnftfon of sywibols; ( ) " t statfstfc 
r2 = correlation coefffcfent 
F • statfstfc 
OF " degrees of freedom 
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While for civilian regimes: 
INFB = 0.68 SPES + 0.25 PCB + 0.48 DI 
(4.34) (2.73) (4.45) 
r2 = 0.912; OF= 13 [4] 
Clear distinctions between the inflation process in military and civilian regimes 
seem to exist, with civilian regimes much more prone to experience increases 
in inflation with increased military expenditures. Civilian regimes also appear 
to experience additional inflationary pressures stemming from rent seeking ac-
tivity, whereas their military counterparts do not. 
The share of investment in GDP In 1981 (GDIB) was estimated as a function 
of the military burden (MEY), defined as the average share of military expenditure 
In GDP, 1981, the average marginal savings rate 1970-81, (MS), and the various 
price distortion indices described above. The results (Table 3) indicate that 
military regimes experience a positive relationship between military expendi-
tures and investment, whereas investment in civilian regimes derives little stim-
ulus from military expenditures. 
The only price distortion statistically significant in affecting investment in the 
military regimes was the exchange rate (EX). Civilian regimes, on the other 
hand, experienced reductions in investment associated with the composite dis-
tortion index (DI); the interest rate (RI), and the distortion level of 
wages (RW). 
Imports were also found to exhibit significant differences between civilian 
and military regimes. Here the growth of imports (ZGB) over the 1970-81 
period was assumed to be a function of exports over the same period (EGB), 
the average level of military expenditures per capita 1970-81 (SPCY), and the 
various price distortions. While none of these variables was statistically significant 
(Table 4) for military regimes, civilian regimes experienced increases in imports 
with military expenditures, exports and several of the price distortions-the 
composite distortion index (DI), the exchange rate (EX), and the distortion 
index for pricing in agriculture (DA). 
At the same time, military governments do not appear to have encouraged 
increases in imports at the expense of local production (such as food in the 
case of civilian regimes). Nor have military regimes yielded, as have civilian 
regimes, to pressure to cheapen imports through over valued exchange rates. 
Another striking contrast between civilian and military regimes exists in the 
relative importance of factors affecting the growth of their respective agricultural 
sectors. For purposes of estimation, the growth of agricultural output (AGB) 
26 American journal of Economics and Sociology 
(1970-81) is assumed to be related to (a) the overall rate of investment, (GDGB), 
during the same time period; (b) agricultural growth (AGA) in the previous 
time period (1960-70), and (c) the average burden MEY over the 1970-81 
period, and various measures of price distortion. 
The military regimes show (Table 5) a generally negative impact of both 
military expenditures and rent seeking on agricultural growth. For these coun-
tries, the level of protection for manufacturing (PM), the distortion level for 
pricing in agriculture (DA), the composite distortion index (DI), and the dis-
tortion level for infrastructure pricing tended to reduce the rate of growth in 
the agricultural sector. In contrast, none of these factors were at work in the 
civilian regimes. 
Finally, civilian and military regimes were found to exhibit several important 
differences in the relative significance of several factors affecting their overall 
rates of growth. The overall rate of (GDPGB) for 1970-81 was assumed to be 
a function of the rate of investment (GDIGB) over the same time period. 
The average share 1970-81 of public consumption in GDP (PCB) was included 
as a control variable to assure that any effects of government expenditures, in 
general, on growth were not attributed to military expenditures. Finally, the 
average level of military expenditures over the 1970-81 period was included in 
the regression along with the various measures of price distortion. 
The results (Table 6) show several interesting patterns: 
1. Military expenditures tend to impact positively on growth in the military 
regimes whereas their impact may be negative in civilian regimes. 
2. While the composite price distortion index tends to be negative when 
regressed on growth in both regimes, the relative importance of the components 
of the distortion index tend to vary considerably between military and civilian 
regimes. 
3. In military regimes, the exchange rate distortion (EX); the distortions in 
interest rates (RI), and the distortions in the overall price level (IN) tend to 
reduce growth. 
4. In civilian regimes, it was the distortion in wages (RW) and infrastructure 
pricing (PT) that tended to retard growth. 
IV 
Conclusions 
THE GENERAL STEREOTYPE of modern Third World military regimes is that they 
are ultra-conservative and use military force to dismantle organizations of popular 
expression, to restrain real wages, to promote integration into world trade and 
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financial markets, and to hold down social reform as well as mass consumption, 
in the Interest of favoring capital accumulation and upper class concentration 
of income.35 The empirical results presented here, while not necessarily at odds 
with this image, places Third World military regimes in a somewhat different 
light compared with their civilian counterparts: 
1. Military regimes appear to be in somewhat better control of military ex-
penditures than their civilian counterparts In the sense that defense allocations 
in these regimes do not produce the generally adverse economic effects such 
as the lower investment, higher growth in imports, declines in the production 
of investment and rates of inflation found in civilian regimes. 
2. While both military and civilian regimes experience rent seeking behavior, 
different groups seem to be favored In each regime type, with civilians favoring 
urban consumers and military regimes favoring Industrial groups. 
3. The net effect of these two contrasting styles of economic management 
appears to produce differing environments whereby defense expenditures tend 
to have a positive overall impact on growth in military regimes and perhaps a 
negative Impact on growth in civilian regimes. 
4. While still conjectural at this point, it appears that military regimes may 
be able, through shifting income from agriculture to finance defense expendi-
tures, to preserve the income levels of key economic groups during periods of 
military build-up. 
5. Civilian regimes, having less control over rent seeking groups (and perhaps 
military pressures for additional equipment), do not appear to be able to combine 
rent-seeking activity and military expenditures in a manner conducive to overall 
growth. 
The analysis above suggests that several choices are open to developing coun-
tries. 
One Is to insist on a pure version of economic efficiency, overriding organized 
groups, seeking to transfer income to themselves via price distortions. For many 
parts of the Third World, this may imply a military regime. 
The other is a civilian regime, which may opt to spend less on defense, but 
will most likely be forced to give In to pressures of organized groups, whether 
Industrialists or urban labor or large landowners, allowing them to dictate eco-
nomic policies in favor of their respective interests. 
A third choice may be to sacrifice allocative efficiency In favor of compromises 
that lessen Inequality and promise wider popular support. Here the government 
would presumably keep working toward improved efficiency to the degree that 
these measures could be accompanied by offsetting policies designed to lessen 
the associated negative impacts on particular social groups. 
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It is not clear from the results presented above, however, whether this path 
can be best Implemented through military or civilian rule. 
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